Are women economically more empowered in Left-run municipalities? A study of Self Help Groups in West Bengal, India by Husain, Zakir et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Are women economically more
empowered in Left-run municipalities? A
study of Self Help Groups in West
Bengal, India
Zakir Husain and Diganta Mukherjee and Mousumi Dutta
Institute of Economic Growth, Delhi, Usha Martin Acdemy,
Kolkata, Presidency College, Kolkata
18. February 2010
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14849/
MPRA Paper No. 14849, posted 19. February 2010 23:35 UTC
Economy and Politics 1 
Are women economically more empowered in Left-run municipalities? 
A study of Self Help Groups in West Bengal, India1 
 
Zakir Husain 
Associate Professor, Institute of Economic Growth,  
Email: dzhusain@gmail.com 
 
Diganta Mukerjee 
Professor, Usha Martin Academy 
Email: digantam@hotmail.com   
 
Mousumi Dutta 
Associate Professor, Economics Department, Presidency College 
Email: dmousumi@hotmail.com 
 
Abstract 
Who controls the income earned by Self Help Group (SHG) members from group 
activities – they, or their husbands? The answer indicates the level of economic 
empowerment attained by SHG members. This paper examines whether identity of 
person controlling this income depends upon the political party ruling the 
municipality where the SHG is situated. Two parties are considered – the Left Front, a 
coalition comprising of Leftist parties, and the Indian National Congress. This paper 
is based on a field study of 240 SHG members in six municipalities in West Bengal, a 
major state in India.  
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Are women economically more empowered in Left-run municipalities? 1 
A study of Self Help Groups in West Bengal, India 2 
1. Introduction 3 
Participation of women in economic activities is often seen as a necessary condition 4 
for their empowerment. However, it is often difficult to involve poor women in 5 
developing countries in such activities. Factors like the lack of education, enterprise 6 
and ability to take risk are important constraints in this context. In such cases policy 7 
makers often rely on Self Help Groups (SHGs) to mobilize women and use their 8 
collective enterprise to involve them in economic activities.  9 
 10 
In India, the Swarna Jayanti Sahari Swarozgar Yojana1 (SJSSY) is an important 11 
group-based poverty alleviation programme focusing on urban areas. The scheme is 12 
centrally sponsored,2 but administered by the State governments. It was launched on 13 
1st December 1997. The objective of the scheme is to provide gainful employment to 14 
the urban unemployed or underemployed poor by encouraging them to set up self-15 
employment ventures or provide wage employment. The scheme also extends 16 
assistance to groups of urban poor women for setting up gainful self-employment 17 
ventures. This sub-scheme is referred to as “The Scheme for Development of Women 18 
and Children in Urban Areas (DWCUAs)”. This component is distinguished by the 19 
focus on poor women residing in urban slums who set up self-employment ventures, 20 
not as individuals, but as groups. Groups of at least 10 women will form self-help 21 
groups (called DWCUAs by members and municipal officers) and take up an 22 
economic activities suited to their skill, training, aptitude and local conditions. While 23 
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the primary objective is employment generation, it is expected that DWCUAs will 24 
also empower its members socially. 25 
 26 
The SJSRY rests on a foundation of community empowerment. Rather than relying 27 
on a foundation of the traditional top-down management, the programme relies on the 28 
establishment of and promoting community organizations and structures to provide 29 
supporting and facilitating mechanisms for local development. While the Poverty 30 
Eradication Cells of the urban local bodies (ULBs) are primarily responsible for 31 
creating the community structures, they are assisted in this task by elected councilors 32 
and local political workers. This links political parties with the implementation of this 33 
scheme, and so the success or failure of the scheme may depend upon the political 34 
party in power. 35 
 36 
In this paper we examine one of the multiple aspects reflecting success of the scheme 37 
– control over the income that the member earns from her DWCUA activities. In 38 
particular, we examine whether the identity of the political party ruling the 39 
municipality determine who controls this income within the household of the Self 40 
Help Group (SHG) member? 41 
 42 
The paper is based on a field survey of 240 SHG members undertaken in 6 43 
Municipalities of West Bengal, a major state in India. The survey was undertaken in 44 
the months of February to August 2009. While questionnaires were administered to 45 
SHG members, officers of the Poverty Eradication Cells (particularly the Town 46 
Project Officer), Councilors and post holders of the community structures forming 47 
part of the SJSSY were interviewed by the authors. 48 
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 49 
The arrangement of the paper is as follows: Section briefly reviews the relevant 50 
literature, and is followed by an outline of the guidelines of the SJSSY in Section 3. It 51 
is followed by the presentation of the findings of the survey. Section 4 focuses on the 52 
research question, while Section 5 offers some explanations of the results. The paper 53 
is concluded by identifying some policy concerns and areas for future research. 54 
  55 
2. Literature Survey 56 
There is a substantial body of research on SHGs. Some researchers have shown how 57 
the spread of SHGs have had beneficial impacts on some household outcomes like 58 
health, nutrition, family planning, education (particularly of the girl child) and family 59 
decision-making (Baden et al., 1994, Pitt and Khandker, 1996, Steele et al., 1998). On 60 
the other hand, other researchers have attempted to examine how patriarchy constrains 61 
the positive effects of SHGs and microfinance. For instance, Goetz and Sengupta 62 
(1996) found that access to credit in a patriarchal setting may actually decrease 63 
functional capabilities of women. Evidence that the patriarchal structure prevailing 64 
within the community limits the success of micro-credit programmes have been put 65 
forward by other researchers also (Kabeer, 2001, Bisnath and Elson, 1999, Sen and 66 
Grown, 1987, Batliwal, 1994). The effect of marital status has also been examined by 67 
researchers. It has been documented that in many cases the credit provided to women 68 
are appropriated by their husbands or other male relatives (Zareen and Khan, 2001, 69 
Goetz and Senupta, 1996, Rahman, 1998). A study of the Rural Employment Creation 70 
Project in Khulna district, Bangladesh, also found that in most cases husbands possess 71 
full control over the income of women beneficiaries and retain decision-making rights 72 
(Parvin et al., 2004).  73 
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 74 
Such literature has tended to ignore the interaction between the political arena and the 75 
SHG movement. A study by Reddy and Manak (2005) finds evidence that joining 76 
SHGs increases participation in the political arena. A similar finding has also been 77 
reported by Hashemi et al. (1996). In recent years, however, there have been claims 78 
that political parties in different regions of India are attempting to use the SHGs as a 79 
means to increase their political base: 80 
“The network of cooperative sector had been used by political parties for their 81 
interest in many ways. Now, the mushrooming of the SHGs has also provided 82 
a good alternative to the parties. The SHGs are a part of the grassroots level 83 
and give easy access to political parties to reach to masses. There always 84 
remains a fear that the SHG movement can suffer if it is exploited by political 85 
parties” (Sanyogita Dhamdhere, cited by Khape, 2009). 86 
 87 
Another study of SHGs in Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Orissa and Rajasthan reported 88 
that “… the members (or their families) often have political leanings and activities 89 
even before they were members of SHGs” (EDA and APMAS, 2006: 5). It is 90 
therefore necessary to examine the relation between the political settings in which the 91 
SHGs are established and how this affects the success of SHGs. This objective forms 92 
the motivation of the current paper. 93 
 94 
3. Guidelines of the SJSSY 95 
As mentioned previously, the DWCUAs are formed by at least 10 members belonging 96 
to BPL families. The social capital necessary for the success of the scheme is built by 97 
first encouraging the women to set up Thrift and Credit Societies/Groups (Groups).3 It 98 
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was observed that Councilors and local cells of the ruling political party play an 99 
important role in such mobilization. Neighbourhood meetings are organized, house to 100 
house campaigns are conducted, and specific women – identified by the local party 101 
workers – are encouraged to join the TCGs. The main activity of TCGs is saving on a 102 
monthly basis, and borrowing money from a Revolving Fund operated by the 103 
Government. 4  104 
 105 
After TCGs operate for some years, the members are encouraged to graduate to the 106 
second stage and form DWCUAs. The group itself selects the income generating 107 
activity. Financial assistance is received from two sources: Revolving Fund, and 108 
commercial loans that is subsidized by the State Urban Development Agency (agency 109 
overseeing implementation of the SJSSY at the state-level).5 Using the funds, 110 
DWCUAs carry on business. They have monthly meetings where the running of the 111 
venture is discussed and operational decisions are made. Part of the surplus is also 112 
distributed among the members. It is control over this income that we are referring to 113 
in this paper. 114 
 115 
In West Bengal, there were 21,717 TCGS with about 0.35 million members in 2007. 116 
DWCUAs, however, evolved more slowly as it was difficult to mobilize women to 117 
form TCGs and develop the social cohesion to set up a joint income earning venture. 118 
As on 31st August 2007 there are 690 DWCUA groups, of whom 229 (33%) have 119 
been linked to banks. The current situation may be seen from Table 1. 120 
 121 
3.2 Selection of Survey Sites and Background 122 
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In this study we surveyed six urban local bodies - Kaliagunj (Uttar Dinajpur), Old 123 
Maldah (Maldah), Barrackpore (North 24 Parganas), Chandannagar (Hooghly), 124 
Burdwan (Burdwan) and Gayeshpur (Nadia). The specific municipalities were 125 
suggested by the SUDA, as they felt that the process of forming DWCUAs was 126 
particularly successful in these areas.  127 
Table 1: Number of TCGs and DWCUAs, Members and Revolving Fund 128 
distributed as on 31 March 2009 129 
 130 
From Table 1 we can see that four of the survey sites have been selected from the six 131 
districts having the largest number of DWCUAs (comprising of Uttar Dinajpur, 132 
Maldah, Birbhum, North 24 Parganas, Murshaidabad and Burdwan). In addition, we 133 
have also surveyed two other Municipalities situated in districts where the 134 
performance of the SJSSY has not been relatively successful. 135 
 136 
Out of the six Municipalities studied, four are controlled by the Left Front coalition 137 
that has been controlling the state of West Bengal since 1977. During this period, the 138 
Opposition had almost dwindled away to non-existence, except in a few pockets like 139 
Maldah and Dinajpur. Both the Municipalities surveyed in these districts are 140 
traditional bastions of the Indian National Congress (INC, called Congress in short).6 141 
In addition, the Trinamool Congress (essentially a splinter group of the INC) is also 142 
emerging as an important political force in the last two year. 143 
 144 
There are also differences in the economic setting of the Municipalities surveyed. 145 
Three of the sites have strong links to the agricultural sector – of which Burdwan is 146 
located in a developed and prosperous agricultural hinterland, while Kaliagunj and 147 
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Old Maldah are agro-based but underdeveloped towns. Barrackpore and Gayeshpur 148 
are industrial towns. Barrackpore was once an important industrial area; over time the 149 
decline of the jute industry has eroded its economic importance. However, its 150 
proximity to the metropolitan city of Kolkata and its well developed educational 151 
infrastructure has resulted in a relatively educated population. Gayeshpur, on the other 152 
hand, is a satellite of the industrial township of Kalyani. It is relatively under-153 
developed. The spectacular success of some specific SHGs led us to study select this 154 
site. The last site, Chandannagar, was originally a French colony, set up in 1784. Its 155 
proximity and transport links to Kolkata has resulted in the growth of the service 156 
sector in this town. 157 
Table 2: Statistics Relating to Urban Local Bodies Surveyed 158 
The district-wise break up of our sample is given in Table 3. 159 
Table 3: Site-wise break-up of Sample 160 
 161 
4. Examining Control over Income from SHG activities 162 
The range of activities undertaken by SHG members vary widely, depending upon 163 
local circumstances. In Kaliagunj and Old Maldah, for instance, many of the 164 
DWCUAs carry on agro-based activities like rice trading, mustard trade, agricultural 165 
stocks, converting grain to rice, farming, livestock farming, poultry farming, fishing, 166 
carpentry, handicrafts, and similar activities. There are also some bakeries and road 167 
side snack stalls in Kaliagunj; two DWCUAs have also set up a catering business. In 168 
Burdwan, a DWCUA had set up a canteen in the Burdwan University; this DWCUA 169 
also supplies food to the in-patients of the Burdwan Medical Hospital. The fact that 170 
Burdwan is the rice granary of West Bengal has also encouraged many DWCUAs to 171 
engage in manufacture and sale of puffed rice. In Barrackpore, the presence of 172 
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Muslims who are culturally associated with the zari trade means that zari production 173 
is an important activity.7 In addition, DWCUAs also manufacture leather bags, jute 174 
bags, and soft toys. Some DWCUAs also run grocery shops; another operates a STD 175 
booth. In Chandannagar, tailoring is a common activity. Dishari also runs a canteen in 176 
an eye Hospital. In all urban local bodies, except Barrackpore, garments and saree 177 
trading is a common activity. In places like Kaliagunj and Old Maldah, women 178 
transport their wares in small vans to adjacent villages, while some door-to-door 179 
trading occurs within the neighbourhood of the women. On the other hand, in 180 
Chandannagar, we also observed fixed shop retailing in sarees. In Gayeshpur, the 181 
DWCUA studied has set up a night shelter for relatives of in-patients admitted to the 182 
local hospital.  183 
 184 
As mentioned earlier, the monthly surplus from SHG activities is distributed among 185 
its members. Such income is quite substantial. The monthly median income from 186 
DWCUA-related activities is Rs. 400, which is roughly about USD 9. This comprises 187 
about 21% of household income. This is of considerable importance in increasing 188 
consumption levels, tiding over seasonal crisis, and acquiring financial and other 189 
assets (savings account, life insurance policies, bicycles, etc.). Expenditure on the 190 
education of their children also comprises an important form of investment. It was 191 
heartening to observe that almost half of the respondents were able to ensure that their 192 
children did not drop out at the commencement of the academic session, when the 193 
demand for cash to purchase books and stationery and pay session fees peaks. This 194 
point was repeatedly emphasized by respondents even during group discussions. For 195 
instance, quite a few respondents said that they met educational expenses out of the 196 
income from DWCUA activities. Another important form of investment was in 197 
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health. About 31% of respondents stated that they were able to afford better medical 198 
facilities after joining DWCUAs. 199 
 200 
4.1 Who Controls Income? 201 
Our survey revealed that almost half of the respondents decide on how to spend their 202 
own income, while about 30% make this decision jointly with their husbands. This 203 
would imply that 80% of respondents have at least some control over their income, 204 
which is very encouraging. However, the relationship between marital status of the 205 
respondent and control over income is important. Since 23 of respondents are either 206 
unmarried or are widows or have been deserted by their husbands, this raises the 207 
possibility that control over income may be the result, not of empowerment, but is 208 
simply due to the lack of male authority figures within the household. Parvin et al. 209 
(1996), for instance, finds a high correlation between marital status and control over 210 
income. This was also supported by statistical tests on our data. We therefore 211 
considered only the sub-sample of 217 married respondents in this paper. 212 
 213 
When considering the site-wise variation of control over income, we found that the 214 
proportion of respondents with full control over income is substantially higher in Left 215 
controlled Municipalities (Fig. 1). 216 
 217 
Fig. 1: Control over Income and Identity of Ruling Party 218 
The magnitude of difference in proportion of respondents with full control over 219 
income from SHG activities between Congress and Left run towns is surprising. After 220 
assigning scores of 0, 0.5 and 1 to the three levels of control, we run a t-test to test for 221 
statistically significant differences in the average scores between the two groups. The 222 
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t-value of 3.4896 is significant at 1% level. However, this test has three 223 
disadvantages. Firstly, the values assigned to scores are ad hoc and may influence 224 
average scores. Secondly, it is based on the assumption of a normal distribution of the 225 
scores. To overcome these methodological problems we have used the Mann-Whitney 226 
U and Kruskall-Wallis H-tests. Since these are based on ranks and do not assume a 227 
normal distribution, they are stronger tests. The results of both these tests confirm our 228 
earlier conclusion – that there is a difference in empowerment levels between Left and 229 
Congress controlled towns – at 1% level of significance. 230 
 231 
4.2 Regression Results 232 
The third problem is common to both the classical and non-parametric tests – neither 233 
control for differences in socio-economic characteristics of respondents. However, we 234 
had pointed out earlier that educational levels are high in Barrackpore and 235 
Chandannagar. If this is true for the other Left towns, as is evident from Table 4, then 236 
the difference may simply reflect differences in education and not political control.  237 
Table 4: Educational Profile of Respondents 238 
 239 
To overcome this problem we have to use a regression model, regressing control over 240 
income (rrinc) on socio-economic characteristics of respondents and a dummy for 241 
Left controlled towns. The explanatory variables are religion and caste dummies (rel 242 
and caste), per capita income (pcy), household size (hhsize), education level of 243 
respondent and husband (redresp and edhusb) and a dummy indicating whether the 244 
respondent is from Left controlled Municipalities (left). In addition, we have also 245 
added a dummy to indicate a newly inducted SHG member (dwcua) to capture the 246 
possible effect of long term membership.  247 
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 248 
Given the discrete, non-binary and ordinal nature of the response variable, an ordered 249 
logit is appropriate, the results of which are given below. 250 
Table 5: Results of Ordered Logit for Control over Respondents Income 251 
 252 
We have also tested for misspecification of the model by regressing rrinc on square of 253 
estimated residual. The insignificance of the coefficient rules out the possibility of 254 
misspecification.  255 
 256 
The results of the regression model shows that even after controlling for socio-257 
economic characteristics, the probability of respondents controlling income from 258 
SHGs is higher if they come from Left-run Municipalities.  259 
 260 
Now the ordered logit model is not a single equation, but a set of assumptions. An 261 
important assumption made in the above regression model is that the coefficients of 262 
each variable in the equations are identical. This, however, is a strong assumption, 263 
and should be tested.  264 
Table 6: Results of Brant test on Ordered Logit Model 265 
 266 
The results of the Brant test indicates that the assumption of equal coefficients does 267 
not hold for three variables – household size, educational level of husband and the 268 
dummy for Left-controlled towns. Re-running the regression model we get: 269 
Table 7: Results of Partial Odds Generalized Ordered Logit model for Control 270 
over Respondents Income 271 
 272 
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 273 
The Left dummy is again significant, but only in the second equation. This means: 274 
1. If we compare between respondents without any control and with joint control, 275 
the probability of having some control is not significantly higher in Left run 276 
towns. 277 
2. However, when we consider respondents with partial and full control, residing 278 
in a Left controlled town significantly increases the probability of being in 279 
control over SHG income. 280 
This indicates that the additional empowerment possibly induced by an allegiance to a 281 
Left leaning political party operates only after a threshold level of empowerment has 282 
been reached. 283 
 284 
5. Seeking an Explanation 285 
While the relationship between identity of the political party controlling the 286 
municipality and the control of SHG member over their income is an interesting one, 287 
it requires explanation. We argue that the differing natures of the two political parties 288 
lead to different levels of participation and involvement in the political arena. This 289 
leads to different levels of awareness, aspirations and empowerment, and gets 290 
reflected in control over income. 291 
 292 
5.1 Organizational Structure and Involvement in Political Sphere 293 
A major difference between the two political parties lies in their organizational 294 
structure. The Indian National Congress is a loosely organized political party that is 295 
based on principles of voluntary participation in party activities. The nature of the 296 
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Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPM, in short), the major constituent of the Left 297 
Front, is quite different. 298 
 299 
The CPM has a regimented and hierarchical structure. Starting from the local level it 300 
has a network of parallel and superior units through the State, or even the Central, 301 
Politburo exercises control over Party members. Members are carefully vetted before 302 
being allowed to join. After joining, these members – and in fact, even non-member 303 
supporters – have to take part in Party activities like demonstrations, meetings, 304 
processions, propaganda activities, classes, social and cultural activities, and so on. 305 
Their activities are evaluated annually and membership renewed only if their 306 
participation is satisfactory. In the case of supporters, also, the CPM demands almost 307 
equal loyalty and evaluate their performance on a regular basis. Those who take part 308 
in Party activities regularly are identified and are rewarded by the distribution of 309 
largesse in various forms. In Chandannagar, for instance, some women supporters 310 
requested the local Councilor to do ‘something’ for them. They were told to form a 311 
DWCU and space to open an outlet (to sell sarees) provided in the Municipal market.8  312 
 313 
Thus, members and supporters of the CPM have to involve themselves to a greater 314 
extent than, say, Congress supporters and members. Further, this style of functioning 315 
reinforces the party identity of a Left supporter or member. 316 
 317 
We found that 54% of respondents in Congress Municipalities participate in party 318 
activities; this proportion is 82% in Left run municipalities. The average score of 319 
political participation in the latter (1.3) is significantly higher than the average 320 
participation score in Congress run municipalities (0.7) at 1% level. The statistical 321 
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difference in scores is also supported by the results of the non-parametric tests. Even 322 
after controlling for socio-economic variables, we find that participation in political 323 
meetings, processions and other party-based activities is significantly higher in Left 324 
run municipalities. 325 
Table 8: Results of Logit Model for Political Participation 326 
 327 
What is interesting is that in most cases, the members had political associations before 328 
joining DWCUAs. While discussing the formation of DWCUAs in Burdwan, 329 
members of Mahila Samitis (Women Councils established by the CPM) and Ward 330 
Committees said that DWCUA members were carefully selected out of supporters. In 331 
fact, enrolling in DWCUAs was often a response of local councilors to the demands 332 
of poor slum dwellers, with a record of participating in political activities, to alleviate 333 
their poverty. It was opined by members of the Ward Committee that this enabled the 334 
party to keep their poor supporters satisfied. During our survey we found that 17% of 335 
the SHG members had been persuaded to join DWCUAs by political workers. In 336 
Burdwan, where the CPM is particularly powerful, 54% of SHG members had been 337 
enrolled by members of the Mahila Samiti or Ward Committee. CDS members, most 338 
of whom have political associations, also play a prominent role in the formation of 339 
DWCUAs. In Barrackpore, they were responsible for enlisting over half the members 340 
of the DWCUAs; in Burdwan, too, this proportion is high (34%). 341 
 342 
5.2 Participation and Empowerment 343 
We next hypothesize that participation in the political arena increases awareness and 344 
aspirations of respondents as they interact with other women, acquire knowledge 345 
about the outside world, learn about rights that women demand or have acquired 346 
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elsewhere, and become more expressive in their actions. As a collective gender-based 347 
identity develops, their participation in demonstrations increases their sense of power 348 
and confidence of effecting gender relations.9 They become more aware that they are 349 
contributing to the family (perceived contribution response increases) and their 350 
welfare should count for in making household decisions (perceived interest response). 351 
This awareness spills over to the household sphere. The fall back situation of party 352 
members and supporters also improve as they develop ties with Mahila Samitis. This 353 
increases their ability to raise demands within their household and their tolerance of 354 
domestic violence. Most important, women start demanding greater control over 355 
income decisions. 356 
Fig. 2: Control over Income and Participation in Political Parties 357 
 358 
Fig. 2 shows that the proportion of respondents with control over income increases 359 
with the level of participation in the political arena. This is also supported by results 360 
of the t-test and non-parametric tests. Results of the ordered logit10 also confirm that 361 
control over income is positively related with political participation (captured through 362 
a dummy, rpmeet), even after controlling for socio-economic characteristics. 363 
Table 9: Results of Ordered Logit for Control over Respondents Income 364 
 365 
5. Conclusion 366 
This paper examines one of the important aspects of empowerment – control over the 367 
income earned by the beneficiaries from SHG activities. In particular, we have 368 
examined whether the identity of the political party implementing the scheme at the 369 
grass root level determines control of income within the household of a Self Help 370 
Group (SHG) member. As pointed out earlier, the SJSRY rests on a foundation of 371 
community empowerment, relying on the establishment of and promoting community 372 
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organizations and structures to provide supporting and facilitating mechanisms for 373 
local development and poverty eradication. Elected councilors, their agents and post 374 
holders of these community structures are involved to a substantial extent in the 375 
mobilization of women to form groups. As this links political parties with the 376 
implementation and consequently the success of this scheme, the question whether a 377 
political subversion of the SHG goals results comes to the fore. 378 
 379 
The results based on our field survey find strong evidence that the SHG movement in 380 
West Bengal has strong cross effects with party allegiance. In particular we see that 381 
the supporters of the more organized Left Front find it easier to establish a voice in 382 
such SHGs. This raises some concerning issues. Firstly, the target group from whom 383 
SHG members are mobilized consist not only of Left Front supporters, but also 384 
Congress supporters and persons who would prefer to be politically neutral. To what 385 
extent such women are included in SHGs, and whether they are empowered, is an 386 
important issue requiring investigation. Secondly, if SHGs do become an instrument 387 
to increase the support base of the Left parties, they run the risk of being labeled as 388 
Party organs. In such cases, if there is a change in political control over the 389 
municipality, the sustainability of SHGs formed by Leftist parties and empowerment 390 
of its members may be threatened. Thirdly, we should keep in mind that this 391 
empowerment is not necessarily the result of joining SHGs, but may be an offshoot of 392 
their participation in the political arena. This would raise the question as to whether 393 
the positive outcomes observed among SHG members are the effect of joining SHGs. 394 
In other words, do the SHG members get empowered as a result of joining SHGs, or 395 
is there a tendency for women who are already empowered to join such movements? 396 
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These questions are worth exploring in future research, with adequately designed 397 
surveys. 398 
 399 
 400 
 401 
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END NOTES 
1
 Literally, ‘Golden Jubilee Urban Employment Programme’. 
2
 75% of the cost of the scheme is borne by the Central Government, while the remaining 25% is borne 
by the State. 
3
 Although the guidelines refer to Thrift and Credit Societies, the members and Municipality officers 
refer to them as Thrift and Credit Groups. We have used the latter form here. 
4
 Allocations out of the Revolving Fund to a TCG is Rs.1000 per member, subject to a ceiling of 
Rs.20,000. This amount may be used for purchasing raw materials, marketing, obtaining infrastructural 
support for income generating or group activities, and some other specified activities not related to 
consumption needs. While the CDs members decide on the TCGs to whom the Revolving Fund will be 
allocated, the TCG decides on how many members will finally obtain the fund, and their respective 
shares. The amount has to be repaid within 10 months at a rate of 2 percent. (One USD is roughly equal 
to Rs.45). 
5
 DWCUAs were entitled, at the time of our study, to a maximum loan of Rs.0.25 million, of which 
45% is obtained from the bank, 50% from the SUDA as subsidy, while 5% represents own 
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contribution. This subsidy is payable only once to a DWCUA. The Equal Monthly Installment (EMI) 
on this loan comes to Rs.3,800 per society. 
6
 Elections to the Old Maldah municipality were held just before our survey. Nominations from the 
Congress were cancelled on technical grounds, leading to a withdrawal of the party from them 
municipal elections. However, we club this ULB with Kaliagunj as it is a traditional Congress citadel, 
as demonstrated by the voting pattern in subsequent Parliamentary elections held in May 2009. 
7
 Zari is the making of designs with golden threads in sarees (local dresses for women). 
8
 This style of functioning is of course, not unique to the CPM. Sud (2003) reports a similar process of 
induction of women into SHGs in Gujarat, with the promise of providing labh (economic gain). 
However, the regimentation of the CPM in regions like West Bengal (where it has a strong base) 
enables it to perform this function more efficiently. 
9
 In Kaliagunj, for instance, the participation of women in demonstration activities against a bank that 
was reluctant in granting loans to women moulded their confidence identity and increased their 
confidence 
10
 Results of the Brant test indicate that the proportional odds assumption holds. 
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Table 1: Number of TCGs and DWCUAs, Members and Revolving Fund distributed as on 31 March 2009 
Thrift & Credit Groups DWCUA Sl. 
No. District 
No. of 
Municipalities 
and 
Corporations 
No of TCGs 
formed No of members 
No of DWCUA 
Groups formed 
No of 
members 
Revolving 
Fund 
distributed 
(Rs. million) 
1 Bankura 3 514 7453 7 91 1.319 
2 Burdwan 11 2548 36946 133 1729 30.48 
3 Birbhum 6 856 12412 206 2678 9.059 
4 Cooch Behar 6 858 12441 24 312 10.134 
5 Dakshin Dinajpur 2 759 11006 64 832 8.648 
6 Darjeeling 5 1142 16559 27 351 18.26 
7 Hooghly 12 2107 30552 76 988 17.151 
8 Howrah 3 793 11500 32 416 3.914 
9 Jalpaiguri 4 475 6888 15 195 3.745 
10 Kolkata 1 1693 24550 13 169 0 
11 Malda 2 631 9150 216 2808 6.478 
12 Murshidabad 7 1352 19604 147 1911 7.495 
13 Nadia 10 2126 30827 54 702 25.134 
14 North 24 Parganas 27 7521 109055 202 2626 88.507 
15 Paschim Medinipur 8 1047 15182 42 546 10.542 
16 Purba Medinipur 5 1563 22664 58 754 16.869 
17 Purulia 3 319 4625 9 117 2.597 
18 South 24 Parganas 7 1511 21910 66 858 15.294 
19 Uttar Dinajpur 4 1081 15675 300 3900 11.8 
Grand Total 126 28896 418999 1691 21983 287.426 
 Source: State Urban Development Agency, Government of West Bengal. 
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Table 2: Statistics Relating to Urban Local Bodies Surveyed 
Urban Local 
Body 
District 
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Barrackpore 
North 24 
Paraganas 
37 1916 
11.6
5 
144411 4459 3.1 2593 58.2 17535 12.1 
Burdwan Burdwan 34 1865 48 285871 59719 20.9 29935 50.1 70064 24.5 
Chandannagar Hooghly 41 1955 20 162166 42894 26.5 20020 46.7 22417 13.8 
Gayeshpur Nadia 18 1995 23 55028 14283 26.0 6844 47.9 17239 31.3 
Kaliaganj Uttar Dinajpur 17 1987 8.99 47639 15600 32.7 14965 - 23789 49.9 
Old Maldah Maldah 38 1869 9.58 62944 41880 66.5 3439 - 32441 51.5 
Sources: State Urban Development Agency, communication dated 15 October 2009.Figures for Kaliagunj and Old Maldah obtained from TPO. 
West Bengal Municipal Development Authority Webpage.  
General Statistics: http://wbdma.gov.in/htm/Ma_4_2_muni%20Catagory_Tab-2.htm; 
Slum Population. http://wbdma.gov.in/htm/Total%20Number%20of%20Slum.htm  
"Census of India 2001: Data from the 2001 Census, including cities, villages and towns (Provisional)". Census Commission of India. Archived 
from http://web.archive.org/web/20040616075334/http://www.censusindia.net/results/town.php?stad=A&state5=999; accessed on 1 June 2004.  
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Table 3: Site-wise break-up of Sample 
Municipality DWCUA 
Members 
No. of Members 
Interviewed 
Percentage of 
Members Interviewed 
Barrackpore 376 44 11.7 
Burdwan 82 13 15.9 
Chandannagar 108 23 21.3 
Gayeshpur 115 5 4.3 
Kaliagunj 3347 110 3.3 
Old Maldah 3289 45 1.4 
TOTAL 7317 240 3.3 
Source: State Urban Development Agency, communication dated 15th October 2009. 
 
Table 4: Educational Profile of Respondents 
Age Group 
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Illiterate - 5.5 - 7.7 - 6.7 
Can read/write 9.1 8.2 8.7 - - 17.8 
Below Secondary 15.9 55.5 34.8 46.2 40.0 51.1 
Completed 
Secondary 
36.4 26.4 43.5 15.4 60.0 17.8 
Higher Secondary 38.6 4.5 13.0 30.8 - 6.7 
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Table 5: Results of Ordered Logit for Control over Respondents Income 
Variables Coefficient z Probability 
rel 0.21 0.44 0.66 
rcaste 0.26 0.90 0.37 
pcy 0.00 -0.73 0.47 
hhsize -0.23 -3.00 0.00 
edhusb 0.24 2.71 0.01 
redres -0.37 -1.95 0.05 
dwcua -0.23 -0.48 0.64 
left 1.00 2.96 0.00 
/cut1 -2.33   
/cut2 -0.78   
McFadden R2 0.076 N 216 
Cox Snell R2 0.146 Log Likelihood -206.16 
Nagelkerke R2 0.167 LR chi2 34.14 
Count R2 0.509 Probability > chi2 0.00 
 
 
 
Table 6: Results of Brant test on Ordered Logit Model 
Variable chi2 p>chi2 df 
All 58.94 0 8 
rel 1.9 0.169 1 
rcaste 1.42 0.233 1 
pcy 0.46 0.496 1 
hhsize 8.01 0.005 1 
edhusb 4.4 0.036 1 
redres 5.78 0.016 1 
dwcua 1.89 0.169 1 
left 11.15 0.001 1 
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Table 7: Results of Partial Odds Generalized Ordered Logit model for Control 
over Respondents Income 
No control vis-à-vis Partial 
Control 
No control & Partial Control 
vis-à-vis Full Control Variables 
Coefficient Probability Coefficient Probability 
rel 0.26 0.59 
rcaste 0.32 0.28 
pcy 0.00 0.62 
redres -0.31 0.11 
dwcua -0.25 0.60 
Same coefficients 
hhsize -0.34 0.00 -0.08 0.40 
edhusb -0.08 0.30 0.28 0.00 
left 0.28 0.33 1.18 0.00 
_cons 1.18 0.00 -0.56 0.60 
N 216  Wald Chi2  48.60 
Pseudo R2 0.118  Probability 0.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: Results of Logit Model for Political Participation 
Variables Coefficient z Probability 
rel 2.67 4.79 0.00 
rcaste -0.17 -0.50 0.62 
pcy 0.00 -1.64 0.10 
hhsize -0.15 -1.77 0.08 
edhusb 0.03 0.29 0.77 
redres -0.08 -0.37 0.71 
dwcua 0.02 0.04 0.97 
left 2.32 4.57 0.00 
_cons -0.90 -0.90 0.37 
McFadden R2 0.200 N 239 
Cox-Snell R2 0.230 Log likelihood -124.90 
Nagelkerke R2 0.316 LR chi2 62.50 
Count R2 0.707 Probability > chi2      0.00 
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Table 9: Results of Ordered Logit for Control over Respondents Income 
Variables Coefficient z Probability 
rel -0.31 -0.68 0.50 
rcaste 0.35 1.19 0.23 
pcy 0.00 -0.70 0.49 
hhsize -0.20 -2.69 0.01 
edhusb 0.25 2.93 0.00 
redres -0.25 -1.38 0.17 
dwcua -0.28 -0.58 0.56 
rpmeet 0.38 2.11 0.04 
/cut1 -2.14    
/cut2 -0.62     
McFadden's R2 0.066 N 216 
Cox-Snell R2 0.127 Log likelihood -208.50 
Nagelkerke) R2 0.146 LR chi2 29.46 
Count R2 0.523 Probability > chi2 0.00 
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Fig. 1: Control over Income and Identity of Ruling 
Party
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Fig. 2: Control over Income and Participation in 
Political Activities
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